

Distributed Detection and Estimation in Wireless Sensor Networks: Resource Allocation, Fusion Rules, and Network Security

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1 Introduction

Overview

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Optimal Quantization and Power Allocation

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- 3 Centralized Quantized Fusion Rules

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- WSNs spatially deployed over a field can be designed to collect information and monitor many phenomena of interest.

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- Important role in several daily application scenarios such as **health-care monitoring**, **home applications**, **smart farming**, **environment monitoring**, and **military**.




Figure 1: (left) A WSN architecture. (right) Smart city infrastructure.

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


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- **Low Power Hardware:** Clearly, the biggest design constraint in WSNs still remains the power consumption. Even-though the SNs are being designed using low-power micro controllers, their power dissipation is still orders of magnitude too high.

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- **Network Security:** Usually unattended (geographically dispersed) and this makes them vulnerable to attacks. The overall detection and estimation strongly depends on the reliability of these SNs.

Contribution-Publications List

- 1 E. Nurellari, D. McLernon, and M. Ghogho "A Secure Optimum Distributed Detection Scheme in Under-Attack Wireless Sensor Networks", in *IEEE Trans. on Signal and Information Processing over Networks (TSIPN)*, April 2017.

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2. Optimal Quantization and Power Allocation

System Architecture




Figure 2: Communication architecture between peripheral SNs and the FC. Each SN generates a test statistic by observing the target and can communicate with the FC only over an **energy-constrained/bandwidth-constrained** link.

2. Simulation Results 1/2




Figure 3: Equal weight ($\alpha_i = \frac{1}{\sqrt{M}}, \forall i$) and optimal weight combining ($\alpha = \alpha_{opt}$) transmit power and channel quantization bits allocation for $P_{fa} = 0.1$, $P_t = 10$, $U = 0.1$, and $M = 10$.

2. Simulation Results 2/2




Figure 4: Receiver operating characteristic with $P_t = 10$, $U = 0.1$ and $M = 10$ for two different weighting schemes.

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


Figure 5: Probability of detection (P_d) versus the signal to noise ratio (ξ_a) for $M = 20$, $N = 10$, $P_t = 10$, $P_{fa} = 0.1$ and $B = 0.5$.

3. Simulation Results 2/3




Figure 6: Probability of detection (P_d) versus the number of samples (N) for $M = 10$ sensors, $P_{fa} = 0.1$, $\xi_a = -8.5$ dB and $B = 1$.

3. Simulation Results 3/3




Figure 7: Probability of detection (P_d) versus number of sensors (M) for $N = 10$, $P_t = 10$, $P_{fa} = 0.1$, $\xi_a = -8.5$ dB and $B = 0.5$.

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4. Distributed Two-Step Quantized Fusion Rules

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


Figure 8: A distributed communication architecture among peripheral SNs. The SNs have partial connectivity (thin lines) among themselves (i.e., not a complete graph).

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Proposition

- Here we propose a scheme, where SN i encodes the data (using a simple uniform quantizer with q_i bits) prior to information exchange.

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$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{if } SNR_{ij} < \Upsilon, e_{ij} = e_{ji} = 0 \\ \text{if } SNR_{ij} \geq \Upsilon, e_{ij} = e_{ji} = 1. \end{array} \right\}$$

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- 2 Υ is a SNR threshold parameter and SNR_{ij} defined as:

$$SNR_{ij} = \frac{p_{ij}^t h_{ij}^2}{\zeta_0 d_{ij}^\gamma}.$$

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$$q_i \leq \frac{1}{2} \log_2 (1 + \Upsilon) \quad \text{bits/sample}$$

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- A **small** Υ means:
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 - ② Allows less transmission bits resulting in an increase in the quantization noise variance.

4. Simulation Results 1/6




Figure 9: Normalized average power consumption ($\mathbb{E}[P_T]$), achievable⁸ probability of detection (P_d^*) and the average communication link density (ρ) versus Υ , with $\sigma_{e_h}^2 = 0$, decision fusion in (5.4.16), $P_{fa}^g = 0.1$, $U = 3$, $N = 20$, $M = 17$ and with α_i (scaled by M).

4. Simulation Results 2/6




Figure 10: Averaged (over 500 h_{ij}^2 realizations) ROC for the proposed two-step weighted algorithm with decision fusion in (40), $U = 3$, $N = 20$, $M = 17$, $K_2 = 3$, $\Upsilon = 30$, $\sigma_{e_h}^2 = 0$ and with α_i (scaled by M) in (5.3.9).

4. Simulation Results 3/6




Figure 11: Averaged (over 500 h_{ij}^2 realizations) ROC against first step iterations number (K_1), with decision fusion in (41), $K_2 = 2$, $U = 3$, $N = 20$, $M = 17$, $\Upsilon = 10$, $\sigma_{eh}^2 = 0$ and with α_i (scaled by M) in (5.3.9).

4. Simulation Results 4/6




Figure 12: Averaged (over 500 h_{ij}^2 realizations) probability of detection (P_d^g) against the signal to noise ratio (ξ_a) with $P_{fa}^g = 0.1$, $U = 3$, $N = 20$, $M = 17$, $K_1 = 320$, $\Upsilon = 20$, $\xi_i = \xi, \forall i$ in (4) and with α_i (scaled by M) in (5.3.9): (left) ideal, $\sigma_{e_h}^2 = 0$; (right) non-ideal, $\sigma_{e_h}^2 \neq 0$.

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


Figure 13: Averaged (over 500 h_{ij}^2 realizations) ROC for the proposed (quantized) two-step weighted fusion rule with $U = 3$, $N = 20$, $\Upsilon = 20$, $M = 17$ and with α_i (scaled by M) in (5.3.9).

4. Simulation Results 6/6




Figure 14: Probability of detection (P_d^g) versus the signal to noise ratio (ξ_a) for $M = 13$, $\Upsilon = 72$, $U = 2$, $N = 20$, $P_{fa}^g = 0.1$ and $\xi_i = \xi, \forall i$ in (3.2.4) and $\alpha_i = 1, \forall i$ in (5.4.4). The topology used is given in right of Fig. 5.5.

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- ① Geographically dispersed to cover large areas, the SNs are constrained in both bandwidth and power. Usually unattended and this makes them vulnerable to different attacks.

Contributions

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- ③ While fusing the data received by the spatially deployed SNs allows the FC to make a **reliable decision**, it is possible that one or more SNs (compromised by an attacker) **deliberately falsify** their local observations.

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Contributions

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- ② **Attacker-based and FC-based parameter optimization are considered and some expressions have been derived.**

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Motivation

- ① Geographically dispersed to cover large areas, the SNs are **constrained** in both bandwidth and power. Usually **unattended** and this makes them **vulnerable** to different attacks.
- ② The overall **detection** performance strongly depends on the **reliability** of these SNs in the network.
- ③ While fusing the data received by the spatially deployed SNs allows the FC to make a **reliable decision**, it is possible that one or more SNs (compromised by an attacker) **deliberately falsify** their local observations.

Contributions

- ① The problem of centralized detection in the **presence of compromised** SNs is investigated.
- ② **Attacker-based** and **FC-based** parameter optimization are considered and some expressions have been derived.
- ③ A reputation based scheme to **identify** the compromised SNs in the network and **control** their **influence** to the global FC decision is also proposed.

5. Sensor Detection in the Presence of Falsified Observations

Communication Architecture




Figure 15: Under attack communication architecture between peripheral SNs and the FC. While the honest SNs test statistics remain unchanged, the compromised SNs falsify their test statistics before transmitting to the FC.

5. Simulation Results 1/4




Figure 16: SN optimal transmit power (p_i^o) and channel bit allocation (L_i) with $P_t = 60$, $U = 3$, $\xi_a = -10.5$ dB, $N = 20$, $\beta = 0.1$ and $\sigma_{eh}^2 = 0$.

5. Simulation Results 2/4




Figure 17: Probability of detection (P_d) versus probability of false alarm (P_{fa}) with $U = 3$, $P_t = 60$, $M = 12$, $N = 20$, $C_i = 0.9, \forall i$ and $\sigma_{eh}^2 = 0$.

5. Simulation Results 3/4




Figure 18: Probability of detection (P_d) versus probability of false alarm (P_{fa}), with $U = 3$, $\xi_a = -10.5$ dB, $P_t = 60$, $M = 12$, $N = 20$, $\beta = 0.2$, $\sigma_{e_h}^2 = 0$ and with optimum weights in (6.2.22).

5. Simulation Results 4/4




Figure 19: Modified deflection coefficient (\tilde{d}^2) versus the attacker strength (C) with $U = 3$, $\xi_a = -10$ dB, $s_i = 0.1, \forall i$, $P_t = 60$, $M = 12$, $N = 20$, $\beta = 0.1$ and $\sigma_{e_h}^2 = 0$.

5. A Secure Sub-optimum Detection Scheme in Under-Attack WSNs




Figure 20: Under attack schematic communication architecture between peripheral SNs and the fusion center (FC). While the i^{th} ($i = \{1, 2, 4, 6\}$) honest SN indicator (test statistic) remains unchanged (i.e., $\tilde{I}_i = I_i$), the j^{th} ($j = \{3, 5\}$) compromised SN falsify its indicator (test statistic) as in (6.3.7) before transmitting to the FC.

5. A Secure Sub-optimum Detection Scheme in Under-Attack WSNs

FC Optimum Weighting

$$\alpha_{opt}^i = \frac{(1 - \beta)(p_d^i - p_{fa}^i) + \beta(p_{fa}^{i,C} - p_d^{i,C})(2P_C^{fal} - 1)}{(1 - \beta)(p_d^i(1 - p_d^i)) + \beta(P_C^{flip} + p_d^{i,C}(1 - 2P_C^{flip}))(1 - P_C^{flip} + p_d^{i,C}(2P_C^{flip} - 1))}. \quad (1)$$

Depends upon the local p_{fa}^i and the p_d^i as well as on the β (fraction of compromised SNs) and the probability of flipping the local decisions by the attacker. The FC **cannot implement** the optimum weight combining fusion rule

Attacker Flipping Probability Optimisation

Lemma 6.3.2: The **optimum** flipping probability ($P_{C,opt}^{flip}$) which **minimizes** the modified deflection coefficient is:

$$P_{C,opt}^{flip} = \frac{\beta - 1}{2\beta} \left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^M \alpha_i (p_d^i - p_{fa}^i)}{\sum_{i=1}^M \alpha_i (p_{fa}^{i,C} - p_d^{i,C})} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \quad (2)$$

5. Simulation Results 1/6





Figure 21: The reliability metric (r_i) versus the FC detection threshold (Λ_f) against the SNs with $M = 40$, $N = 20$, $\beta = 0.5$, $P_C^{flip} = 1$ and $K = 150$.

5. Simulation Results 2/6




Figure 22: Probability that the (compromised) SN 37 has been truly detected ($P_d^{37,true}$) versus the FC detection threshold (Λ_f) with $M = 40$, $N = 20$, $\beta = 0.5$, $P_C^{flip} = 1$ and $\delta = 0.009$.

5. Simulation Results 3/6




Figure 23: Average compromised SNs detection probability and honest SNs mis-detection probability versus the time window length (K) and against β with $M = 40$, $N = 20$, $P_C^{flip} = 1$ and $\delta = 0.009$.

5. Simulation Results 4/6




Figure 24: The $P_d - P_{fa}$ metric versus the time window length (K) against the FC detection threshold (Λ_f) with $M = 40$, $N = 20$, $\beta = 0.25$, $P_C^{flip} = 0.2$, $\delta = 0.95$ and $\mu = 10$.

5. Simulation Results 5/6




Figure 25: Probability of detection (P_d) versus probability of false alarm (P_{fa}) with $M = 40$, $N = 20$, $\beta = 0.5$, $P_C^{flip} = 1$ and $K = 5$.

5. Simulation Results 6/6




Figure 26: Probability of detection (P_d) versus probability of false alarm (P_{fa}) against δ and μ with $M = 40$, $N = 20$, $\beta = 0.25$, and $P_C^{flip} = 1$.

Summary

- We derive the optimum fusion rule and then analyze sub-optimum fusion rules that are realizable and easily implemented in practical WSN deployment scenarios. The effect of fading channels on detection performance is minimized by solving the resource allocation problem.

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- We have addressed the **fully distributed detection** problem and proposed signal processing algorithms for such an approach \Rightarrow Very **attractive** from both the signal processing perspective and the communication point of view.

Questions/Comments